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INTRODUCTION 
Advanced c o n t r o l  technology poses a d i f f i c u l t  task f o r  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  
faced with specifying airworthiness f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  requirements--and f o r  
t h e  manufacturers who must comply with and a n t i c i p a t e  these  requirements. 
Requirements f o r  advanced c i v i l  t r anspor t s  employing t h i s  technology must be 
c a r e f u l l y  framed, such t h a t  publ ic  s a f e t y  is ensured and technological ad- 
vances i n  c i v i l  av i a t ion  are not discouraged. It is  no secret t h a t  exces- 
s i v e l y  complex and overs t r ingent  requirements discourage innovation, while 
clear and f l e x i b l e  requirements ( for  example, those that give c r e d i t  f o r  re- 
l i a b i l i t y  i n  systems) encourage development and.advances i n  technology. 
The s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  requirements involves considera- 
t i o n  of t h e  complete pilot-airframe-systems loop, t h e  task,  and t h e  environ- 
ment. Figure 1 suggests t h e  complexity of this job; many of t hese  advanced 
c i v i l  conf igura t ions  tend t o  be l a r g e  and f l e x i b l e  and dependent on complex 
c o n t r o l  systems f o r  enhancement of s t a b i l i t y ,  c o n t r o l  e f fec t iveness ,  and con- 
t r o l  f e e l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  over enlarged f l i g h t  envelopes, and f o r  numerous 
automatic c o n t r o l  modes. The r e s u l t  is  a g r e a t l y  increased emphasis on f a i l -  
u r e  e f f e c t s  t h a t  degrade f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s .  
clude: 
Which f a i l u r e s  and combinations must be demonstrated? 
demonstrated? 
Key questions being faced in- 
How good must t h e  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  be i n  t h e  f a i l u r e  condition? 
And how must they be 
French and B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  i n  preparing f o r  Concorde SST c e r t i f i c a -  
t i o n ,  authored a new form of f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  requirements t h a t  r e l y  heavily 
on p r o b a b i l i s t i c  analyses (TSS P a r t  3,  ref. 1 ) .  I n  TSS 3,  t h e  required 
standard of f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  varies according t o  t h e  l ike l ihood of t h e  f l i g h t  
condition occurring, and thus  considers t h e  wide range of f l i g h t  phases, 
system f a i l u r e  e f f e c t s ,  and atmospheric environment. Although it is  being 
applied t o  Concorde by European a u t h o r i t i e s  and some fea tu res  of t h e  method 
have been u t i l i z e d  i n  U.S. m i l i t a r y  spec i f i ca t ions ,  t h e  TSS 3 approach has  
m e t  with mixed r eac t ions  among t h e  U.S. c iv i l  a v i a t i o n  community because of 
concerns over t h e  p r a c t i c a l  implementation of t h e  method. 
Since 1969, an  ongoing NASA/FAA research  program has used t h e  Ames 
F l igh t  Simulator f o r  Advanced A i r c r a f t  (FSAA) i n  t h e  development of c e r t i f i -  
c a t i o n  criteria f o r  supersonic c r u i s e  a i r c r a f t .  NASA, FAA, indus t ry  repre- 
s en ta t ives ,  and B r i t i s h  and French airworthiness a u t h o r i t i e s  are p a r t i c i p a t -  
ing  i n  t h i s  program. The question of proper accoun tab i l i t y  of f a i l u r e s  has  
arisen on numerous occasions. These experiences have brought t o  a focus t h e  
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need t o  review t h e  present treatment of f a i l u r e  cases i n  t h e  requirements and 
t o  examine some of t h e  questions associated wi th  implementation of t h e  TSS 3 
type of concept. 
This paper, which r e p o r t s  on t h e  f ind ings  t o  d a t e  from a continuing study 
of t h e  subjec t ,  comprises t h e  following: a review of t h e  treatment of f a i l -  
u r e  cases i n  va r ious  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  requirements; a desc r ip t ion  of methods 
used and relevant lessons  learned from recent  Autoland c e r t i f i c a t i o n  programs 
as an example of applied p robab i l i t y  procedures; a d iscuss ion  of uncertain- 
ties about t h e  TSS approach; and f i n a l l y  (because these  procedures i n d i c a t e  
an increasing r e l i a n c e  on simulation methods), a desc r ip t ion  of three recent  
experiences with marginal configurations that demonstrate t h e  p o t e n t i a l  s ig-  
n i f i cance  of elements sometimes omitted from simulation tests. 
CURRENT TREATMENT OF FAILURE CASES I N  VARIOUS 
FLYING QUALITIES REQUIREMENTS 
A i r c r a f t  f l y i n g  quali t ie 's  requirements d e a l  pr imar i ly  with con t ro l l ab i l -  
i t y ,  s t a b i l i t y ,  and handling c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  Civi l  and m i l i t a r y  require- 
ments w e r e  reviewed f o r  t h e  manner i n  which f a i l u r e  cases were covered, t h e  
amount of f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  degradation allowed, t h e  conditions under which 
f a i l u r e s  w e r e  t o  be assessed ( for  example, in t roduct ion  of atmospheric ef- 
f e c t s ) ,  and methods f o r  demonstrating compliance. (As used throughout t h i s  
paper, t h e  term "fa i lure"  includes malfunctioning as w e l l  as f a i l u r e  t o  
function; degraded system performance below spec i f i ed  to le rances  represents  
a f a i l u r e  t o  func t ion  properly.) Documents reviewed included Federal  Avia- 
t i o n  Regulations app l i cab le  t o  t r anspor t  category a i r p l a n e s  (FAR 25, ref. 2),  
Tenta t ive  Airworthiness Standards f o r  Supersonic Transports (TASST, ref. 3),  
indus t ry  recommendations (AIA committee r epor t ,  r e f .  4 and SAE Aerospace 
Recommended P rac t i ce  842B, r e f .  5), Franco-British Concorde TSS Standards 
(TSS, r e f .  l), and U.S. m i l i t a r y  spec i f i ca t ion  (MIL-F-8785BY as described i n  
r e f .  6). 
Federal  Aviation Regulations - FAR 25 and TASST 
For o r i en ta t ion ,  an  o u t l i n e  of FAR 25 is  shown i n  f i g u r e  2. Flying 
q u a l i t i e s  requirements are contained i n  "Subpart B - Fl ight , "  which is 
f u r t h e r  broken down i n t o  top ic  headings. 
c l o s e l y  i n t e r r e l a t e d  with many performance requirements (many of which in- 
volve engine f a i l u r e  condi t ions) ,  t h i s  d i scuss ion  i s  primarily concerned 
with those items indica ted  by an  arrow, and t h e  r e l a t e d  paragraphs i n  "Sub- 
p a r t  D - Design and Construction" and "Subpart F - Equipment." 
Although f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  are 
F a i l u r e  Cases i n  FAR 25- Philosophy towards treatment of f a i l u r e s  has 
undergone s i g n i f i c a n t  change i n  recent  years. 
mu l t ip l e  f a i l u r e  cases w e r e  two-engine-inoperative con t ro l  requirements and 
a requirement t h a t / t h e  a i r p l a n e  be con t ro l l ab le  with a l l  engines inopera- 
tive. In Apr i l  1970, 
For years,  about t h e  only 
Only s i n g l e  c o n t r o l  system f a i l u r e s  w e r e  considered. 
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Amendment 25-23 incorporated a number of changes i n t o  FAR 25 deal ing  with 
system f a i l u r e s  and introducing t h e  consideration of mul t ip l e  f a i l u r e s .  
S t a b i l i t y  augmentation systems and automatic systems w e r e  d e a l t  with spec i f -  
i c a l l y .  Some of t h e  new requirements came from t h e  t e n t a t i v e  SST require- 
ments and were recognized t o  be genera l ly  appl icable  and needed because of 
t h e  increasing dependence on more complex systems of t h e  new generation of 
subsonic t ranspor t s .  
treatment of con t ro l  system f a i l u r e s .  
capab i l i t y  of continued s a f e  f l i g h t  and landing a f t e r  any s i n g l e  con t ro l  
system f a i l u r e  or a f t e r  any combination of f a i l u r e s  not shown t o  be extremely 
improbable. 
The example shown i n  f i g u r e  3 i l l u s t r a t e s  the present 
As ind ica ted ,  FAR 25.671 requi res  the 
, 
Current FAA i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  terms "probable," "improbable," and 
"extremely improbable" i s  shown i n  t h e  sketch below. 
EXTREMELY f- IMPROBABLE PROBABLE- IMPROBABLE 1 
I I I I I 1 I I 1 
10-1' 10-9 1 o - ~  1 o - ~  1 o - ~  
FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE PER FLIGHT HOUR 
Fa i lu re  cases i n  t h e  o ther  a i r c r a f t  systems must a l s o  be analyzed under 
"Subpart F - Equipment." 
tinued s a f e  f l i g h t  and landing a f t e r  any f a i l u r e  condition not extremely 
improbable, FAR 25.1309 r equ i r e s  t h a t  t h e  systems and assoc ia ted  components 
be designed so t h a t  
I n  addi t ion  t o  requi r ing  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  of con- 
"the occurrence of any o ther  f a i l u r e  conditions which 
would r e s u l t  i n  i n j u r y  t o  t h e  occupants, o r  reduce t h e  
c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  a i r p l a n e  o r  t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  crew 
t o  cope with adverse operating conditions i s  improbable." 
I n  addi t ion ,  near ly  a l l  requirement sets conta in  c a t c h a l l  paragraphs 
which are i n  general  t e r m s ,  but provide eva lua t ion  p i l o t s  b a s i s  f o r  r e j e c t i o n  
of unsa t i s f ac to ry  s i t u a t i o n s  not  covered s p e c i f i c a l l y .  An example of t h i s  is  
FAR 25.143 which states 
"(a) The a i r p l a n e  must be s a f e l y  con t ro l l ab le  and 
maneuverable during - (1) takeoff;  (2) climb; (3) level 
f l i g h t ;  (4) descent; and (5) landing. (b) It must be 
poss ib le  t o  make a smooth t r a n s i t i o n  from one f l i g h t  
condition t o  any o ther  without exceptional p i l o t i n g  
s k i l l ,  a l e r tnes s ,  o r  s t r eng th  and without danger of 
exceeding t h e  limit-load f a c t o r  under any probable 
operating conditions (including t h e  sudden f a i l u r e  of 
any engine) . 'I 
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The phrase "under any probable operating conditions" i s  c e r t a i n l y  sub- 
ject  t o  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  as including f a i l u r e  cases. 
Fa i lu re  Cases i n  TASST- I n  TASST ( re f .  3), t h e  FAA presented t e n t a t i v e  
airworthiness standards f o r  study, t r i a l  app l i ca t ion ,  and comment during t h e  
d e t a i l  design and prototype phase of supersonic t r anspor t  development. -A 
number of changes w e r e  proposed i n  t h i s  document o ther  than those  a l ready  
discussed, including requirements t o  cover automatic and manual trim system 
malfunctions, a d d i t i o n a l  two-engine-inoperative c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  and maneuver- 
a b i l i t y  requirements, and extended " f l u t t e r ,  deformation and f a i l - s a f e  cri- 
teria" t o  consider combinations of f a i l u r e s  not shown t o  be extremely im- 
probable. I n  t h e  "Stab i l i ty"  sec t ion ,  i t  w a s  recognized t h a t  areas of f l i g h t  
( for  example, supersonic c ru i se )  may e x i s t  with opera t iona l  requirements such 
t h a t  t h e  use  of r e l i a b l e  automatic f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  systems could be accepted 
i n  l i e u  of t h e  demonstration of classic s ta t ic  s t a b i l i t y ,  provided t h e  loss 
of automatic f l i g h t  con t ro l  would no t  r e s u l t  i n  unsafe handling character-  
istics. 
The "Structures" sec t ion  of TASST is  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s .  
Paragraph 25.301(e) states t h a t  
"For supersonic a i r c r a f t ,  loads must be determined 
within t h e  design f l i g h t  envelope considering t h e  ef-  
f e c t s  of s t a b i l i t y  augmentation and automatic f l i g h t  con- 
t r o l  systems, including probable f a i l u r e s  and changes i n  
systems c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which can be expected i n  service. 
All malfunctions and f a i l u r e s  of t hese  systems must be 
considered under FAR 25.671 and FAR 25.1309 wi th in  t h e  
normal f l i g h t  envelope except those  shown t o  be extremely 
improbable. " 
Careful cons idera t ion  of t he  complete pilot-aircraft-systems loop and 
t h e  environment appear very important i n  s a t i s f y i n g  t h i s  requirement. 
no te  t h a t  t h i s  introduces t h e  assessment of f a i l u r e  e f f e c t s  ou ts ide  t h e  
normal f l i g h t  envelope (see sketch).  The app l i ca t ion  of f l i g h t  simulation 
techniques would appear t o  be  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  t h i s  task.  
Also 
NORMAL FLIGHT ENVELOPE - 
PROBABLE AND IMPROBABLE 
FAILURES (> per hour) 
MUST BE CONSIDERED IN 
THIS REGION 4 
h ' DESIGN FLIGHT ENVELOPE - 
PROBABLE FAILURES 
(> per hour) MUST BE 
CONSIDERED IN THIS REGION 
M 
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Turbulence and F l e x i b i l i t y  Effects- In t h e  introductory d iscuss ions  t o  
both t h e  "Cont ro l lab i l i ty  and Maneuverability" and t h e  "Stab i l i ty"  sec t ions  
of TASST, i t  w a s  recognized t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  of turbulence on t h e  p i l o t  en- 
vironment should be evaluated. I n  addi t ion ,  it was  pointed out t h a t  t h e  
s t r u c t u r a l  f l e x i b i l i t y  and s t a b i l i t y  characteristics of supersonic trans- 
p o r t s  w i l l  undoubtedly aggravate t h e  p i l o t  environment problem. 
perience with t h e  XB-70 and F-12 series a i r c r a f t  lends considerable weight t o  
these  statements--as have some p i lo t ed  simulator experiences with l a r g e  
f l e x i b l e  configurations t o  be described later. It is very  l i k e l y  t h a t  many 
of t h e  advanced t r anspor t  designs w i l l  exh ib i t  g r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  than cur- 
rent subsonic t r anspor t s  and, as w i l l  be shown, t h e  e f f e c t s  on handling 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i n  failure-mode operations can be very s i g n i f i c a n t .  
F l i g h t  ex- 
Industry Recommendations 
AIA Study Group Proposals- I n  1970, a s p e c i a l  p ro j ec t  group represent- 
i ng  t h e  A i r c r a f t  Indus t r i e s  Association (AIA) published t h e  r e s u l t s  ( r e f .  4 )  
of a study t o  guide t h e  modernization of t he  Federal  A i r  Regulations. I n  
re ference  4, proposed "modernized" requirements are presented as a set of 
s a f e t y  standards genera l ly  appl icable  t o  - a l l  t r anspor t  a i r c r a f t  types. 
These standards descr ibe  bas i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  05 t h e  a i r c r a f t  system t h a t  
must be achieved t o  ensure s a f e  operation. In  add i t ion ,  means f o r  showing 
p a r t i a l  o r  complete compliance with t h e  ind iv idua l  standards are included. 
Two fundamental requirements formed t h e  foundation f o r  a l l  t h e  standards 
proposed : 
"1. The a i r c r a f t  must respond t o  commands of t h e  con- 
t r o l l i n g  i n t e l l i g e n c e  i n  a cons is ten t  manner and 
with t h e  prec is ion  appropr ia te  t o  t h e  task.  
Probable subsystem f a i l u r e s  must no t  r e s u l t  i n  
conditions l i k e l y  t o  be ca tas t rophic  due t o  human 
i n a b i l i t y  t o  cope with them." 
2. 
These modernized standards spec i fy  th ree  modes of operation (manual, 
command, automatic), conveying c l e a r l y  t h a t  t h e  con t ro l l i ng  i n t e l l i g e n c e  is 
not always considered t o  be t h e  human p i l o t .  They state f u r t h e r  t h a t  i f  man 
is t h e  con t ro l l i ng  in t e l l i gence ,  he  should be considered a subsystem of t h e  
t o t a l  a i r c r a f t  system. I n  t h i s  way, t h e  standard dealing with operation 
following f a i l u r e s  accounts f o r  f a i l u r e s  of human o r i g i n  i n  add i t ion  t o  o ther  
subsystem f a i l u r e s .  This standard states, 
"Operation following probable f a i l u r e  of any subsystem 
t h a t  a f f e c t s  f l i g h t  s a f e t y  s h a l l  not unduly restrict 
f l i g h t  operation a f t e r  co r rec t ive  a c t i o n  is taken. 
The degree of r e s t r i c t i o n  permitted s h a l l  be inverse ly  
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p robab i l i t y  of f a i lu re . "  
It then presents  requirements r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  take  co r rec t ive  
ac t ion ,  e i t h e r  by t h e  crew or  by automatic means. 
compliance d e a l  more s p e c i f i c a l l y  with t h e  f a i l u r e s ,  and include paragraphs 
The acceptable means of 
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t h a t  p a r a l l e l  FAR 25.671(c) and 25.672(c) ( f ig .  3) .  
SAE Design Criteria- Recommended design cri teria f o r  handling q u a l i t i e s  
of c iv i l  t r anspor t  a i r c r a f t  (SAE ARP 842B, r e f .  5) d i f f e r  i n  charac te r  from 
t h e  s a f e t y  requirements described previously. These criteria represent  ad- 
v i so ry  design information as defined by t h e  SAE and were o r i g i n a l l y  modeled 
a f t e r  t h e  format of t h e  m i l i t a r y  spec i f i ca t ions  of t h e  e a r l y  s i x t i e s .  
cri teria appear t o  have avoided t h e  use of p robab i l i t y  terminology and in- 
clude cons idera t ion  of s i n g l e  and dua l  c o n t r o l  system f a i l u r e s .  
These 
' I . . .  Following t h e  [ s ing le]  most critical f a i l u r e  i n  
t h e  [power o r  boost] f l i g h t  con t ro l  system, t h e  planned 
f l i g h t  may be completed without a s i g n i f i c a n t  degrada- 
t i o n  of f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s .  ... Following t h e  second 
most cr i t ical  f l i g h t  con t ro l  system f a i l u r e ,  i t  s h a l l  
be poss ib le  t o  complete t h e  f l i g h t ,  a f t e r  takeoff ,  t o  
a s u i t a b l e  a i r p o r t  from the  V2 t r a n s i t i o n  t o  enroute 
climb t o  c r u i s e  t o  a s a f e  landing with t h e  most cr i t ical  
engine inopera t ive  a t  t h e  most c r i t i ca l  phase of f l i gh t . "  
They f u r t h e r  state t h a t  f a i l u r e  of any a r t i f i c i a l  s t a b i l i t y  system o r  
powered-actuated t r i m  system should not r e s u l t  i n  an unsafe f l i g h t  condition. 
Some of t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  cri teria ( fo r  example, lateral cont ro l )  are rede- 
fined f o r  t h e  f a i l u r e  cases t o  accept degraded capab i l i t y .  
The s ign i f i cance  of a e r o e l a s t i c  e f f e c t s  i s  recognized i n  paragraph 
2.1.7 of ARP 842B which states 
"Since it can be expected t h a t  a e r o e l a s t i c  e f f e c t s  
w i l l  play an  important r o l e  i n  supersonic t ranspor t  
design, it should be  c l e a r  t h a t  a l l  requirements f o r  
f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  are appl icable  t o  t h e  elastic air- 
frame. " 
Franco-British TSS 3 
General Description and Objectives- A new approach t o  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  
requirements w a s  developed by t h e  French and B r i t i s h  airworthiness authori-  
ties i n  preparation f o r  t h e  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  of supersonic t r anspor t s ,  Concorde 
i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  F i r s t  published i n  1969 as TSS 5 and s ince  changed t o  TSS 3 
( r e f .  l), these  requirements are cu r ren t ly  being applied t o  Concorde. Thair 
most s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a t u r e  is  t h e  extensive use of p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and systems 
ana lys i s  methods i n  def in ing  t h e  minimum acceptable f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  f o r  a 
given f l i g h t  s i t u a t i o n ,  considering t h e  f l i g h t  phase, a i r c r a f t  configuration, 
f a i l u r e  state, and environment. The s e v e r i t y  of t h e  requirement is  d i r e c t l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p robab i l i t y  of occurrence of t h e  f l i g h t  s i t u a t i o n .  This con- 
cept  has s ince  been u t i l i z e d  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  Provisional Airworthiness Re- 
quirements f o r  Civi l  Powered-Lift A i rc ra f t  ( r e f .  7) and i n  modified form i n  
t h e  cu r ren t  U.S. m i l i t a r y  spec i f i ca t ion  MIL-F-8715B. 
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This approach provides t h e  following s i g n i f i c a n t  advantages: 
1. a more systematic and complete coverage of a l l  l i k e l y  f l i g h t  con- 
d i t i o n s ,  whereas pas t  methods have tended t o  be l imi ted  t o  a n t i c i -  
pated c r i t i ca l  regions 
cons idera t ion  of atmospheric environment e f f e c t s  i n  a more complete 
manner 
a running assessment of t h e  relative r i s k  level throughout t h e  design 
and development phases f o r  a new a i r c r a f t ,  which provides i n s i g h t  f o r  
design modifications 
a method f o r  def in ing  those cases t h a t  can be eliminated from demon- 
s t r a t i o n  because of t h e  low p robab i l i t y  of occurrence. 
2. 
3. 
4 .  
The TSS standards are intended t o  provide t h e  same s a f e t y  l e v e l s  f o r  
supersonic t r anspor t s  as f o r  subsonic a i rp l anes  introduced i n t o  se rv ice  a t  t h e  
same time. These ob j ectives include t h e  following : "For a l l  a i rwor th iness  
causes t h e  t o t a l  p robab i l i t y  of Catastrophic Ef fec t s  should be Extremely Re- 
mote per hour of f l i g h t ] ,  and t h e  t o t a l  p robab i l i t y  of Hazardous Ef- 
f e c t s  should be remote [<lO-5] or  Extremely Remote." 
t i o n  of t e r m s . )  Akin t o  FAR 25, t hese  objec t ives  state that "No s i n g l e  Fa i l -  
u r e  or  combination of f a i l u r e s  not considered Extremely Improbable s h a l l  re- 
s u l t  i n  a Catastrophic Effect." They fu r the r  r equ i r e  that "Remote Fa i lu re s  
s h a l l  not r e s u l t  i n  Hazardous Effects" and t h a t  "Recurrent Fa i lu re s  s h a l l  re- 
s u l t  only i n  Minor Effects." 
(See t a b l e  1 f o r  de f in i -  
The TSS 3 requirements are categorized i n t o  t h r e e  groups, corresponding t o  
t h e  accident causes a t t r i b u t e d  t o  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s :  (1) handling - a workload 
consideration, (2) maneuverability, and (3) involuntary exceedance of a i r p l a n e  
limits caused by disturbances due t o  f a i l u r e s  o r  atmospheric conditions.  Var- 
ious  s p e c i f i c  cri teria are included which, depending on t h e  p robab i l i t y  of oc- 
currence of a given "state" (categorized as frequent,  occasional,  exceptional,  
and non-exceptional), must be s a t i s f i e d .  
ments, based on judgment and experience, which r e q u i r e  demonstration regard- 
less of t h e  estimated p robab i l i t y  of occurrence. 
There are a l s o  a number of require- 
Theore t ica l  Application- Figures 4 and 5 i l l u s t r a t e  t h e o r e t i c a l  applica- 
t i o n  of t h e  TSS 3 concept. (Reference 9 po in ts  out that p r a c t i c a l  applica- 
t i o n  r equ i r e s  many simplifying assumptions, although l i t t l e  information on 
these  assumptions has been found i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e . )  F i r s t ,  t h e  var ious  
poss ib l e  f l i g h t  "tasks" and t h e i r  associated p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of occurrence per 
f l i g h t  are defined. A s  shown i n  f i g u r e  4 ,  a t a s k  i s  defined by four primary 
elements p lus  t h e  secondary workload: (1) t h e  f l i g h t  subphase, f o r  example, 
l o c a l i z e r  capture;  (2) state of the atmosphere; (3) state of t h e  a i r c r a f t ,  
which includes poss ib le  f a i l u r e s ;  and ( 4 )  f l i g h t  technique. Elements 1 and 
4 represent lists prepared by t h e  appl icant  while elements 2 and 3 represent  
four-dimensional matrices. The p robab i l i t y  Pn of a given t a s k  per  f l i g h t  
is  then ca lcu la ted  from estimates of t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of (1) performing a 
given subphase per f l i g h t ,  (2) encountering a given atmospheric state during 
t h e  subphase, (3) having a given a i r c r a f t  state during t h e  subphase, and ( 4 )  
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using a given f l i g h t  technique. 
Figure 5 represents  t h e  au thor ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of a method described i n  
TSS 3 f o r  showing compliance with t h e  genera l  handling requirement. 
evaluation of a given t a s k  i d e n t i f i e s  a class of d i f f i c u l t y  C y  which is then 
converted t o  t h e  p robab i l i t y  Pu t h a t  a p i l o t  w i l l  no t  be a b l e  t o  accomplish 
t h e  workload. The p robab i l i t y  of a handling inc ident  during a given subphase 
per f l i g h t  is  determined by summation over t h e  classes of d i f f i c u l t y  of t h e  
product of Pu and Pn f o r  t h a t  subphase. The t o t a l  p robabi l i ty  of a hand- 
l i n g  inc ident  per f l i g h t  i s  computed by summation over a l l  t h e  subphases t h a t  
make up a f l i g h t .  
be less than a s a f e t y  index, which has been defined as an acceptable r i s k  
l eve l .  
P i l o t  
For p a r t i a l  compliance, t h i s  t o t a l  p robab i l i t y  must then 
TSS 3 states that t h e  demanded s a f e t y  l e v e l  is  t o  be demonstrated by a 
l imi ted  number of f l i g h t  tests proposed by t h e  appl icant .  ( J u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
tests omitted is  a l s o  required.) The majority of t hese  are t o  be conducted 
i n  calm air  o r  low turbulence. Compliance with requirements f o r  f l i g h t  i n  
turbulence are t o  be demonstrated by a l imi ted  number of f l i g h t  tests, sup- 
ported by t h e o r e t i c a l  s t u d i e s  and simulator tests. 
From t h i s  b r i e f  descr ip t ion ,  i t  i s  clear t h a t  numerous questions can be 
r a i sed  regarding t h e  practical app l i ca t ion  of t h i s  approach and t h a t  consid- 
e rab le  s impl i f i ca t ions  are needed. I n  t h e  next s ec t ion ,  s impl i f i ca t ions  are 
described which have been made i n  t h e  app l i ca t ion  of a similar procedure i n  
t h e  U.S. m i l i t a r y  spec i f i ca t ion .  
t o  rest, d iscuss ions  i n  t h e  following sec t ions  address many of t he  expressed 
concerns, and point t h e  way f o r  continuing work. 
While a l l  t h e  unce r t a in t i e s  are not l a i d  
U.S. Mi l i t a ry  Spec i f ica t ion  (MIL-F-8785B) 
S imi l a r i t y  with TSS Concept- MIL-F-8785B (presented with background in- 
formation i n  r e f .  6 )  serves  dua l  r o l e s  as design requirements and as evalua- 
t i o n  criteria. A t  a 1971 AGARD meeting, a paper ( r e f .  9) w a s  presented com- 
paring t h e  TSS 3 concept and MIL-F-8785B. It concluded t h a t  they are basic- 
a l l y  t h e  same i n  i n t e n t s  and goals,  although one d i s t i n c t i o n  w a s  made: i n  
addi t ion  t o  assur ing  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be no l i m i t a t i o n s  on f l i g h t  s a f e t y  due 
t o  d e f i c i e n t  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s ,  MIL-F-8785B demands t h a t  mission e f f ec t ive -  
ness  w i l l  not be compromised. S imi l a r i t y  of t h e  two criteria is  not coin- 
c iden ta l ;  d i scuss ion  following presenta t ion  of t h e  AGARD paper acknowledged 
t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  cont r ibu t ions  made by M. Wanner, representing t h e  Service 
Technique Aeronautique of France and a s t rong  advocate of t h e  TSS 3 concept, 
during t h e  prepara t ion  of MIL-F-8785B. 
A number of simplifying assumptions have been made t o  permit practical 
app l i ca t ion  of MIL-F-8785B, including: 
(1) No p robab i l i t y  assessment is  made f o r  a i r c r a f t  m a s s  and m a s s  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n .  A probab i l i t y  of 1 is used f o r  a l l  po in t s  i n  t h e  
envelope. Thus, p robab i l i t y  of state of t h e  a i r c r a f t  is dependent 
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on f a i l u r e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  only. 
(2) N o  attempt is made t o  estimate t h e  p robab i l i t y  of t h e  state of t h e  
atmosphere. The required f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  are associated with t h e  
state of t h e  a i rp lane .  (A number of s p e c i f i c  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  re- 
quirements must be m e t  with spec i f ied  turbulence conditions,  how- 
ever. ) 
(3)  The p robab i l i t y  of being i n  a given area of t h e  f l i g h t  envelope has 
been assumed equal t o  1, due t o  i n a b i l i t y  t o  spec i fy  t h i s  value.  
"Levels" of Flying Qual i t ies -  Three l e v e l s  of f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  are de- 
fined i n  MIL-F-8785B7 as shown i n  t a b l e  2. Cooper-Harper p i l o t  r a t i n g s  gen- 
e r a l l y  assoc ia ted  with t h e  th ree  l e v e l s  are a l s o  shown. Exceptions t o  these  
r e l a t ionsh ips  e x i s t ,  however. For example, l e v e l  3 f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  f o r  a 
landing t a s k  would correspond t o  a p i l o t  r a t i n g  no poorer than 6.5 ( requi res  
adequate performance; see f i g .  6) .  
The minimum required f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  are defined separa te ly  for air- 
plane normal states and a i r p l a n e  f a i l u r e  states. For a i r p l a n e  normal states,  
level 1 f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  are required within t h e  opera t iona l  f l i g h t  envelope, 
and level 2 within t h e  se rv ice  f l i g h t  envelope ( f ig .  7 ) .  For a i r p l a n e  f a i l -  
u r e  states, t h e  p robab i l i t y  of encountering l e v e l  2 f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  must be 
less than 
p robab i l i t y  of encountering l e v e l  3 f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  must be less than lom4 
per f l i g h t  i n  the  opera t iona l  f l i g h t  envelope and less than loB2 i n  t h e  
se rv ice  f l i g h t  envelope. 
per f l i g h t  within t h e  opera t iona l  f l i g h t  envelope and the  
Theore t ica l  Compliance Procedure- Figure 8 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  procedure 
outlined i n  MIL-F-8785B f o r  determining t h e o r e t i c a l  compliance with the  f a i l -  
u r e  state requirements. 
f e c t  on f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  are f i r s t  i d e n t i f i e d  and t h e  corresponding probabil- 
i t i es  of encounter per f l i g h t  are computed, based on t h e  longes t  f l i g h t  dura- 
t i o n  t o  be encountered during opera t iona l  missions. The degree of f ly ing  
q u a l i t i e s  degradation assoc ia ted  with each a i r p l a n e  f a i l u r e  state i s  de ter -  
mined i n  terms of levels as defined i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c  requirements. The most 
c r i t i ca l  a i rp l ane  f a i l u r e  states are then determined (assuming t h e  f a i l u r e s  
are present a t  whichever poin t  i n  t h e  f l i g h t  envelope being considered i s  
most c r i t i c a l  i n  a f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  sense),  and t h e  t o t a l  p robab i l i t y  of 
encountering level 2 f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  i n  t h e  opera t iona l  f l i g h t  envelope due 
t o  equipment f a i l u r e s  is  computed. Likewise, t h e  p robab i l i t y  of encounter- 
i ng  l e v e l  3 f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  i n  t h e  opera t iona l  f l i g h t  envelope i s  computed. 
The computed values are then compared with t h e  requirements. 
Airplane f a i l u r e  states that have a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f -  
Concept Recommended f o r  Civ i l  Airworthiness Application- Many of t h e  
m i l i t a r y  spec i f i ca t ions  w e r e  o r i g i n a l l y  recommended by Cornel1 Aeronautical 
Laboratory, Inc. (now t h e  Calspan Corporation) under cont rac t  t o  t h e  A i r  
Force F l i g h t  Dynamics Laboratory. I n  1973, Calspan completed a review of 
t h e  "Flight" subpart of t h e  Yellowbook (Tentative Airworthiness Standards 
f o r  Powered L i f t  Transport Category Ai rc ra f t )  f o r  t he  FAA. The f i n a l  r epor t  
( r e f .  11) proposed t h a t  t h e  Yellowbook be revised t o  a new format based on 
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many of t h e  ideas  used i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  spec i f i ca t ion  and i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  
Provis iona l  Airworthiness Requirements f o r  Civi l  Powered-Lift A i r c r a f t  
( r e f .  7) .  
General Observations 
Based on review of t h e  var ious  requirements, several observations can be 
made. A l l  elements of t h e  a v i a t i o n  community have acknowledged t h e  need f o r  
increased a t t e n t i o n  t o  f a i l u r e  e f f e c t s  and have made t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  from 
s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  t o  mul t ip l e  f a i l u r e  philosophy. 
u r e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and t h e i r  e f f e c t s  has become a s i g n i f i c a n t  f ac to r  i n  f l i g h t  
c e r t i f i c a t i o n  of a i r c r a f t  employing s t a b i l i t y  augmentation, automatic, and 
powered con t ro l  systems. 
t o  f u l l  advantage, t h e  system f a i l u r e s  and e f f e c t s  analyses are even more 
important. 
t e m s  and f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  d i sc ip l ines .  Present U.S. c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p r a c t i c e  
appears t o  treat t h e  systems and f ly ing  q u a l i t i e s  evaluations somewhat 
separa te ly ,  w i th  t h e  e f f e c t s  of f a i l u r e s  o f t e n  defined by a n a l y t i c  means i n  
t h e  systems s tudies .  
pas t ,  t h e  foregoing observations suggest t h a t  they w i l l ,  a t  t h e  very least, 
r equ i r e  reexamination f o r  f u t u r e  appl ica t ions .  
The predic t ion  of system f a i l -  
For a i r c r a f t  employing a c t i v e  con t ro l s  technology 
This r e s u l t s  i n  a growing need f o r  c l o s e  in t eg ra t ion  of t h e  sys- 
While t h i s  procedure may have served adequately i n  t h e  
General recogni t ion  is  apparent t h a t  atmospheric e f f e c t s  (e.g., turbu- 
lence) can inf luence  an a i rp l ane ' s  handling c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  and 
should be considered, although t h e  method of including t h i s  is  loose ly  de- 
fined. The high cos t  of f l i g h t  t e s t i n g ,  t h e  l a r g e  number of cases t o  be 
evaluated, t h e  d e s i r e  t o  assess i n  spec i f ied  atmospheric conditions,  and a t  
marginally s a f e  conditions can be expected t o  increase  t h e  r e l i a n c e  on 
p i lo t ed  f l i g h t  simulators f o r  much of t h i s  work. 
FAILUM CASE ANALYSES I N  AUTOLAND CERTIFICATION 
Systems s a f e t y  ana lys i s  procedures used i n  recent  Autoland c e r t i f i c a -  
t i o n  programs represent  cur ren t  examples of t h e  app l i ca t ion  of p robab i l i t y  
procedures t o  t h e  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  of t o t a l  airframe-systems combinations, in- 
cluding cons idera t ion  of atmospheric e f f e c t s .  
sh ip  with t h e  evaluation concepts previously discussed, t h e  procedures used 
i n  t h e  Category I I I A  automatic landing programs f o r  t h e  McDonnell Douglas 
DC-10 and t h e  Lockheed L-1011 ( r e f s .  12-14) w e r e  reviewed and re levant  find- 
i ngs  are noted. 
Because of t h e  c l o s e  r e l a t ion -  
Procedures 
The procedure described i n  r e f .  13 appears t o  be genera l ly  representa- 
t i v e  of t h e  programs f o r  both airplanes.  The c e r t i f i c a t i o n  process, which 
r ep resen t s  t h e  f i n a l  cyc le  of s tud ie s  made i n  t h e  design and development 
phases, used progressive simulation and t e s t i n g ,  as indicated i n  f i g u r e  9,  
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i n  order  t o  minimize t h e  amount of f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  required.  The f i r s t  s t e p  
w a s  t h e  use  of high-speed repe t i t ive-opera t ion  s imulat ion methods t o  accom- 
p l i s h  the m i l l i o n s  of landings required f o r  establishment of the low prob- 
a b i l i t y  r e s u l t s  i n  a reasonable  time period. I n  t h e  second phase, s eve ra l  
thousand simulated landings w e r e  made using t h e  a c t u a l  f l i g h t  hardware com- 
puters .  The hydraul ic  con t ro l  systems hardware ("iron bird") w a s  then added 
t o  t h e  s imulat ion i n  order  t o  p ick  up e f f e c t s  of any hardware imperfections.  
F ina l ly ,  a minimal number of f l i g h t  test demonstrations (on t h e  order  of a 
hundred) were made t o  v e r i f y  the high end of t h e  performance p robab i l i t y  
curves.  Some of t h e  simulated f a i l u r e  e f f e c t s  were v e r i f i e d  by i n s e r t i n g  
f a i l u r e s  i n t o  the au top i lo t  during a c t u a l  approaches. 
w a s  used t o  v e r i f y  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  preceding phase. 
Each of t hese  phases 
Environmental condi t ions  f o r  t hese  s imulat ions included turbulence and 
wind shear ,  with levels spec i f i ed  i n  FAA Advisory Ci rcu lar  20-57A. I n  t h e  
DC-10 program, key performance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  sensors ,  analog com- 
puter ,  and mechanical c o n t r o l s  were va r i ed  between s imulat ion runs within t h e  
normally expected ranges using a Monte Carlo sampling rou t ine  ( r e f .  1 2 ) .  
Not evident i n  t h e  procedure j u s t  described is t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  and 
s a f e t y  ana lys i s ,  a considerable  t a s k  cons is t ing  bf an in t eg ra t ed  combination 
of s eve ra l  kinds of ana lyses  and computer s imulat ion techniques.  This ex- 
t ens ive  process is  described i n  d e t a i l  i n  r e f .  12 .  Su f f i ce  t o  say t h a t  i t  
involved iden t i fy ing  a l l  poss ib l e  s i n g l e  and mul t ip l e  f a u l t s  i n  t h e  system 
and t h e i r  e f f e c t s ,  e l imina t ing  a l l  s i n g l e  f a u l t s  t h a t  were hazardous, and 
e s t ab l i sh ing  t h a t  no mul t ip l e  f a u l t  i n  t h e  system having a p robab i l i t y  of 
occurrence g rea t e r  than 10-9 p e r  landing w a s  hazardous. 
Relevant Findings 
In tegra ted  Programs Necessary- Ordinary numerical r e l i a b i l i t y  analyses  
were recognized a t  t h e  o u t s e t  t o  be inadequate f o r  f u l l y  assess ing  Autoland 
system r e l i a b i l i t y  and sa fe ty .  Because of t h e  bas i c  system complexity, t h e  
airhorne-ground systems i n t e r f a c e s ,  and the  numerous p i l o t - a i r c r a f t  i n t e r -  
faces ,  i n t eg ra t ed  programs of labora tory  t e s t i n g ,  computer analyses ,  and 
s imulat ion w e r e  found necessary.  
Design Guidance Provided- C e r t i f i c a t i o n  cons idera t ions  began with the  
design phase. A s  t h e  system design evolved, t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  and s a f e t y  
analyses  provided continued assessment of compliance and i d e n t i f i e d  areas 
requi r ing  design modif icat ion.  Consideration of f a i l u r e  e f f e c t s  s i g n i f i -  
c a n t l y  inf luenced t h e  design of many o ther  a i r c r a f t  systems, f o r  example, 
electrical supply. 
Mult iple  F a i l u r e  Analysis Found Manageable- The mul t ip le  f a i l u r e  analy- 
sis appeared a t  f i r s t  t o  be an almost impossible t a sk ,  requi r ing  t h e  com- 
b ina t ion  of a l l  poss ib l e  f a i l u r e s  i n  a l l  poss ib le  sequences and analyzing t h e  
r e s u l t .  This  t a s k  became manageable by f i r s t  def in ing  what w a s  hazardous and 
then working backward t o  f ind  a l l  combinations of f a u l t s  t h a t  could produce 
t h e  event.  
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Defin i t ion  of Atmospheric Disturbances Needed- Atmospheric disturbance 
e f f e c t s  can become primary design f ac to r s .  In  some f l i g h t  tests, f o r  example, 
a condition not an t i c ipa t ed  t o  be critical--a quar te r ing  tailwind-was found 
t o  be serious.  
i f i e d  wind shear va lues  may be inadequate. 
such disturbances makes accura te  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  atmosphere e s s e n t i a l .  
Other f l i g h t  test experience has indicated t h a t  present spec- 
The p o t e n t i a l  s ign i f icance  of 
Broad-based Engineering Judgment Necessary- A fundamental merit and a 
hazard of t h e  p robab i l i t y  approach are revealed i n  t h i s  quotation from r e f .  
13 : 
"The p robab i l i t y  approach t o  ana lys i s  seems, from 
experience, t o  have g rea t  m e r i t  i n  t h a t  t h e  necess i ty  
t o  c a l c u l a t e  very low p robab i l i t y  numbers fo rces  on 
t h e  ana lys t  a d i s c i p l i n e  t h a t  makes him study t h e  sys- 
t e m  i n  g rea t e r  d e t a i l .  The danger i n  t h e  approach i s  
t h a t  t h e  ana lys t  may place too much emphasis on t h e  
techniques he has developed, and l o s e  s i g h t  of t h e  
many assumptions implied i n  these  techniques. I n  
sho r t ,  t he re  is  a danger of placing impl i c i t  be l ie f  
on t h e  accuracy of a calculated. number. This danger 
can be avoided by t h e  use of highly s k i l l e d  engineers 
who are capable of understanding system and a i r c r a f t  
operation as w e l l  as the  d e t a i l e d  working of t he  cir- 
c u i t s  t o  be analyzed." 
Concluding Observations 
Although t h e  Autoland systems sa fe ty  ana lys i s  procedures described here- 
i n  appeared extremely cumbersome a t  the  o u t s e t ,  i n  a c t u a l  p r a c t i c e  they be- 
came manageable--while providing s i g n i f i c a n t  payoffs i n  t e r m s  of design 
guidance and improved sa fe ty .  It should a l s o  be noted, however, t h a t  while 
t h e  e f f o r t  involved i n  an Autoland c e r t i f i c a t i o n  program is undoubtedly 
l a rge ,  t h e  e f f o r t  appears small when compared t o  t h e  t o t a l  e f f o r t  required 
i n  r igorous ly  applying t h e  procedures of TSS 3 t o  an advanced t ranspor t  air- 
c a a f t  over i t s  e n t i r e  f l i g h t  envelope. The number of cases t o  be considered 
f o r  Autoland is  limited: t h e  Autoland process is  concerned primarily with 
t h e  f i n a l  few minutes of f l i g h t ,  and t h e  con t ro l l i ng  i n t e l l i g e n c e  can be 
mathematically modeled more r ead i ly  than can t h e  human p i l o t .  
UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING THE TSS APPROACH 
While t h e  p o t e n t i a l  advantages of t h e  TSS 3 type of approach have been 
shown t o  be very s i g n i f i c a n t  ( p a r t i a l l y  v e r i f i e d  by t h e  Autoland experience), 
numerous questions and unce r t a in t i e s  have been r a i sed  regarding i t s  p rac t i -  
cal implementation. These can be grouped under the  following headings: 
r e l i a n c e  on p robab i l i t y  methods and r e l i a b i l i t y  pred ic t ion ,  (2) s i z e  of t h e  
evaluation matrix, (3) use of t h e  p i l o t  r a t i n g  scale, ( 4 )  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  
(1) 
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atmospheric environment, and (5) use  of simulation methods. I n  t h e  following 
discussion, each of t hese  has been addressed i n  order t o  provide some in- 
s i g h t  i n t o  these  top ic s ,  t o  d i s p e l  some f e a r s ,  and t o  i n d i c a t e  where f u r t h e r  
work is  needed. 
Reliance on P robab i l i t y  Methods and R e l i a b i l i t y  Prediction- Concern has 
been expressed with regard t o  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  de f ine  some of t h e  required 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  such as t h e  f l i g h t  subphase, p i l o t  technique, and atmospheric 
environment. Conservative engineering estimates of t h e  f i r s t  two should be 
poss ib le  with c a r e f u l  study. Def in i t ion  of t he  p robab i l i t y  of a given atmos- 
pheric environment appropr ia te  t o  a given subphase requi res  more research 
( t o  be discussed l a t e r ) .  
I n  r e l i a b i l i t y  and s a f e t y  analyses,  t he re  is  always t h e  danger of 
A s  pointed out i n  TSS 3 and i n  r e f s .  "blind f a i t h "  i n  t h e  ca lcu la ted  number. 
8 and 15, these  methods are used as an a i d ,  not as t h e  s o l e  c r i t e r i o n ;  i t  is  
e s s e n t i a l  that they be combined with good engineering judgment and experience. 
The p r a c t i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  of a given method must be taken i n t o  account and 
experience with o ther  a i r c r a f t  i n  service must be factored i n t o  t h e  t o t a l  
assessment. For example, t h e  present s a fe ty  assessment of redundant systems 
goes f a r  beyond the  f a i l u r e  ana lys i s  by considering poss ib le  e f f e c t s  of er- 
r o r s  by t h e  crew and maintenance personnel, as w e l l  as the  e f f e c t s  of events 
ou ts ide  t h e  a i r c r a f t  which could a f f e c t  more than one channel a t  a t i m e .  
Redundant systems are checked f o r  common f a u l t s  t o  ensure, f o r  example, t h a t  
both e l e c t r i c a l  systems are not routed through a common wiring bundle or 
under ga l l eys  and t o i l e t s ,  o r  t h a t  l i n e s  from both hydraulic systems are not  
supported by a common bracket. 
A common question asks  how probabi l i ty  va lues  of t he  order of 
f l i g h t  hour can be estimated wi th  confidence. 
t h i s  is exac t ly  t h e  reason f o r  t h e  philosophy t h a t  no s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  can 
create a ca tas t rophic  f l i g h t  condition. The period of proof-testing re- 
quired t o  prove t h i s  f a i l u r e  rate would be impractical .  However, t h e  in- 
d iv idua l  f a i l u r e  rates of i n t e r e s t  i n  mul t ip le - fa i lure  analyses,  of t he  order 
of can usua l ly  be estimated with reasonable confidence. It is  a l s o  
intended t h a t  c r i t i ca l  system f a i l u r e  records be kept on new a i r c r a f t  enter-  
ing  service over t h e  i n i t i a l  period of operation t o  v e r i f y  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  
estimates . 
per 
Reference 16 po in t s  out t h a t  
Evaluation Matrix- The matrix of conditions requi r ing  evaluation under 
t h e  procedure described i n  TSS appears awesome. However, considerable s i m -  
p l i f i c a t i o n  appears poss ib le  and m e r i t s  continued study. Also, i n  p rac t i ce ,  
t h e  number of f a i l u r e s  t o  be inves t iga ted  normally tu rns  out t o  be a manage- 
ab le  number ( r e f .  8) .  The f a u l t  ana lys i s  usua l ly  shows a l imi ted  number of 
ways a system can malfunction following a v a r i e t y  of s i n g l e  and mul t ip le  
f a u l t s .  
p robabi l i ty  of occurrence i s  c l e a r l y  sa t i s f ac to ry .  
Many can be discarded because t h e  r e s u l t  i s  not s e r ious  o r  t h e  
Use of t h e  P i l o t  Rating Scale- Concern has been expressed over making 
a p i l o t  r a t i n g  scale a p a r t  of l e g a l  regulation, t o  be used i n  determining 
t h e  minimum s a f e t y  l e v e l  of an a i rp lane .  Questions faced whenever t h e  p i l o t  
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r a t i n g  scale is  used become espec ia l ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  when i t  is t h e  minimum 
s a f e  boundary being defined. What p i l o t s  are t o  do 
t h e  r a t i n g ,  how many, how t o  ex t r apo la t e  from t h e  f l i g h t  test  s i t u a t i o n  t o  
t h e  opera t iona l  one, etc. These questions and o the r s  are worthy of c a r e f u l  
study and reso lu t ion .  Considerable worthwhile d iscuss ion  on many of these  
i s sues  i s  contained i n  r e f .  10. Many of t h e  questions r a i sed ,  however, are 
not unique t o  the  TSS procedure, but are equally appl icable  t o  t h e  present 
evaluation process where t h e  subjec t ive  opinions of t he  airworthiness p i l o t s  
are key f a c t o r s  i n  def in ing  t h e  accep tab i l i t y  of a given a i rp lane .  
Typical questions are: 
Def in i t ion  of t h e  Atmospheric Environment- Def in i t ion  of t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
elements of t h e  atmospheric environment and associated p r o b a b i l i t i e s  is  an 
area receiving considerable a t t e n t i o n  i n  t h e  U.S. and i n  Europe, and j u s t i f i -  
ab ly  so.  
some as f ly ing  q u a l i t i e s  are degraded and t h e  workload approaches t h e  satura- 
t i o n  point.  
The influences of atmospheric disturbances become espec ia l ly  trouble- 
Many of t h e  turbulence models cu r ren t ly  being used i n  simulation s t u d i e s  
have been t a i l o r e d  t o  match power spectra measurements. Other concepts are 
being studied. For example, recent work i n  t h e  U.K., stimulated by Autoland 
experience, is  inves t iga t ing  t h e  u s e  of discrete gust pa t t e rns  ( r e f .  17) ,  and 
work i s  continuing i n  t h i s  country under NASA sponsorship a t  t h e  University of 
Washington and elsewhere t o  develop %on-Gaussian" models. Also, an inves t i -  
ga t ion  devoted t o  v e r i f i c a t i o n  or improvement of present methods f o r  modeling 
a i r c r a f t  response t o  turbulence appears worthwhile. 
Simulation Methods- The preceding discussions leave l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  t h e  
use of simulation methods w i l l  play an increas ingly  key r o l e  i n  the  design, 
development, and c e r t i f i c a t i o n  of advanced t ranspor t  a i r c r a f t .  The applica- 
t i o n  of simulators t o  t h e  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  demonstration process must not be 
approached naively,  but with apprec ia t ion  f o r  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of these  methods 
and f o r  t h e  degree of f i d e l i t y  (math model, p i l o t  s t a t i o n  layout,  v i s u a l  d i s -  
play,  motion, e t c . )  required f o r  s p e c i f i c  tasks .  Representation of t he  appro- 
pr ia te  workload l e v e l ,  f o r  example, is  an important f ac to r  i n  evaluating mini- 
mum s a f e  handling q u a l i t i e s .  
For a s a f e t y  assessment as defined i n  TSS 3 ,  development of t h i s  simula- 
t i o n  c a p a b i l i t y  e a r l y  i n  t h e  design phase, with progressive updating of t h e  
a i rp l ane  model and t h e  p i l o t / p i l o t  s t a t i o n  in t e r f ace ,  appears e s s e n t i a l .  Ac- 
q u i s i t i o n  of d a t a  f o r  improvement of simulation f i d e l i t y  must be factored i n t o  
layout of e a r l y  f l i g h t  tests. Accurate representa t ion  of f a i l u r e  annunciators 
and warning devices must be incorporated as they are defined, as they are im-  
por tan t  elements i n  t h e  evaluation of a proposed system's accep tab i l i t y .  
RELATED SIMULATION EXPERIENCES 
The preceding discussions lead t o  t h e  conclusion t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  acceptance 
of many a i r c r a f t  f a i l u r e  states may be based l a rge ly  on simulator evaluations 
(and engineering judgment), Three recent simulation experiences have empha- 
720 
sized f a c t o r s  which, with more s t a b l e  configurations,  might have been consid- 
ered of secondary importance, but became cr i t ical  components requi r ing  accura te  
representa t ion  i n  t h e  simulation of marginal configurations.  
s i z e s  t h e  s ign i f i cance  of turbulence e f f e c t s ,  t h e  second ind ica t e s  t h e  impor- 
tance  of motion cues i n  c r i t i ca l  t a sks ,  and t h e  t h i r d  demonstrates con t ro l  
l i m i t a t i o n s  that can be imposed by s t r u c t u r a l  mode e f f e c t s .  
The f i r s t  empha- 
Turbulence Ef fec t s  
I n  1972, p a r a l l e l  s t u d i e s  w e r e  conducted on two simulators t o  inves t iga t e  
t h e  SAS-failed approach and landing of delta-wing t r anspor t s  ( r e f s .  18 and 
19). Three research  test p i l o t s  performed ground-based evaluations on t h e  
NASA/Ames six-degree-of-freedom F l igh t  Simulator f o r  Advanced A i r c r a f t  (FSAA), 
followed by f l i g h t  evaluations on t h e  USAF/Calspan To ta l  In-Flight Simulator 
(TIFS), both shown i n  f i g u r e  10. I n  a matrix of twenty test configurations,  
seventeen were uns tab le  longi tudina l ly .  
under IFR conditions,  breakout t o  VFR conditions a t  91-m (300-ft) a l t i t u d e ,  
v i s u a l  approach and landing. 
crosswind approach, glide-slope e r r o r  cor rec t ion ,  l o c a l i z e r  e r r o r  cor rec t ion ,  
and moderate (0.91 m/sec or  3.0 f t / s e c  rms) turbulence. Of these,  t h e  turbu- 
lence  t a sk  proved t o  be the  most cr i t ical ,  although t h e  turbulence i n t e n s i t y  
used w a s  not uncommon (probabi l i ty  of encountering turbulence of 0.91 m/sec or 
g rea t e r  i s  on t h e  order of 0.1 t o  0.3). 
The primary t a s k  w a s  an ILS approach 
A series of approaches with added t a sks  included 
P i l o t  r a t i n g  d a t a  from both inves t iga t ions  is  shown versus a divergence 
parameter, time t o  double amplitude of angle of a t t a c k  T2 , i n  f i g u r e  11. 
P i l o t  r a t i n g s  from t h e  FSAA study are shown by t h e  shaded gand, with t h e  scat- 
ter primarily a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  i n t e r p i l o t  va r i a t ion .  Values of T2, of 6 sec 
and g rea t e r  were found t o  be acceptable f o r  t h e  emergency case. A s  T2, de- 
creased (divergence rate increased) below t h i s  l e v e l ,  p i l o t  r a t i n g s  show t h a t  
handling c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  de t e r io ra t ed  rapidly.  
I n i t i a l  examination of t h e  TIFS p i l o t  r a t i n g  d a t a  showed considerable 
scatter due t o  t h e  varying turbulence i n t e n s i t i e s  encountered during t h e  
f l i g h t s .  I n  analyzing t h e  da ta ,  Calspan used measurements of t h e  a c t u a l  t u r -  
bulence environment t o  compensate t h e  p i l o t  r a t i n g  da ta  f o r  each configuration. 
These r e s u l t s  are shown i n  f i g u r e  11 f o r  gust i n t e n s i t i e s  of 0.46 m/sec (1.5 f t /  
sec) and 0.91 m/sec (3.0 f t / s e c ) .  
l e v e l s  of turbulence i n t e n s i t y  appears small, t h e  d i f f e rences  i n  subjec t ive  
evaluation were s ign i f i can t .  
Although t h e  d i f f e rence  between t h e  two 
Motion Ef fec t s  
An i nves t iga t ion  w a s  conducted a t  Ames recen t ly  t o  i d e n t i f y  the  r o l e  of 
A p i lo t ed  cockpit  vertical acce le ra t ion  cues i n  t h e  landing t a s k  ( r e f .  20). 
simulator having very l a r g e  amplitude v e r t i c a l  motion (24 meters t o t a l  t r a v e l )  
w a s  u t i l i z e d  i n  a test series i n  which t h e  f i d e l i t y  ("washout") of t h e  v e r t i c a l  
acce le ra t ion  reproduction w a s  d e l i b e r a t e l y  varied over a wide range, represent- 
ing simulators with varying amounts of ava i l ab le  vertical  t r ave l .  The ex te rna l  
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v i s u a l  scene w a s  provided by a black and white uncollimated TV monitor. 
a i rp l ane  simulation represented a l a r g e  sweptwing business j e t  t ranspor t .  
Three l e v e l s  of static long i tud ina l  s t a b i l i t y  w e r e  simulated, corresponding t o  
15 percent static margin, n e u t r a l ,  and 5 percent uns tab le  s ta t ic  margin. 
The 
The r e s u l t s  indicated t h a t  v e r t i c a l  motion cues w e r e  u t i l i z e d  i n  t h e  land- 
Figure 1 2  shows a measure of landing 
ing t a s k  and w e r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  important i n  t h e  simulation of a i r c r a f t  with 
marginal longi tudina l  handling q u a l i t i e s .  
performance, a l t i t u d e  rate a t  touchdown, p lo t t ed  aga ins t  t he  motion washout 
f i l t e r  n a t u r a l  frequency %. The corresponding v e r t i c a l  t r a v e l  requirements 
are shown along t h e  top scale. The da ta  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  of motion w a s  
r e l a t i v e l y  inconsequential  f o r  landing of t h e  s t a b l e  configuration with good 
f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s ,  although an  o s c i l l a t o r y  tendency w a s  observed without motion. 
However, with t h e  conf igura t ions  having marginal longi tudina l  handling quali-  
ties, s i g n i f i c a n t  degradation w a s  apparent i n  achievable performance as t h e  
motion w a s  constrained (and thereby d i s t o r t e d ) .  A t  va lues  of of 1.0 and 
above, divergent f l i g h t  path o s c i l l a t i o n s  were common and touchdowns were es- 
s e n t i a l l y  uncontrolled i n  many landings. 
S t r u c t u r a l  Mode Ef fec t s  
I n  another simulation program i n  which a very l a r g e  f l e x i b l e  a i r c r a f t  w a s  
represented complete with s t r u c t u r a l  modes, a very  s i g n i f i c a n t  degradation i n  
f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  r e su l t ed  from the  p i l o t  s t a t i o n  motions caused by fuse lage  
bending. Evaluations of t h e  completely unaugmented a i r p l a n e  without motion 
and body bending r e su l t ed  i n  p i l o t  r a t i n g s  of 5.0 - 5.5 ( f ig .  6) .  With motion 
and body bending, t he  s t r u c t u r a l  modes w e r e  e a s i l y  excited and the  p i l o t s  were 
unable t o  use t h e  sharp pulse inputs  ( i n  p i tch)  normally used f o r  con t ro l  of 
an uns tab le  a i rp lane .  This prevented t h e  use of e f f e c t i v e  con t ro l  techniques 
and yielded a p i l o t  r a t i n g  of 9. 
Recommendat i ons  
These examples have i l l u s t r a t e d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c a r e f u l  a t t e n t i o n  must be 
devoted t o  def in ing  t h e  simulation requirements f o r  a given task. 
gree of soph i s t i ca t ion  i s  o f t e n  required i n  evaluations of marginal cases i f  
confidence is t o  be placed i n  t h e  r e s u l t s ,  
procedures w i l l  very l i k e l y ,  by necess i ty ,  r e l y  on s impl i f ied  simulations (very 
l imi ted  motion, no s t r u c t u r a l  mode representa t ion ,  e t c . )  f o r  t h e  bulk of t h e  
work. It is  emphasized t h a t  v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g  of c r i t i c a l  cases should be 
planned i n  simulation f a c i l i t i e s  which provide a high f i d e l i t y  of t h e  t o t a l  
t a s k  presentation. 
A high de- 
P r a c t i c a l  design and evaluation 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Advanced t ranspor t  a i r c r a f t  designs have become increas ingly  dependent on 
complex f l i g h t  con t ro l  systems i n  order t o  improve t h e i r  f l i g h t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
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I n  t h i s  r epor t ,  var ious  c i v i l  and m i l i t a r y  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  requirements have 
been reviewed with regard t o  t h e i r  treatment of f a i l u r e  cases and considera- 
t i o n  of atmospheric environment e f f e c t s .  
of t h e  philosophy t h a t  no s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  should c r e a t e  an unsafe f l i g h t  con- 
d i t i o n ,  nor should any combination of f a i l u r e s  t h a t  are not extremely improb- 
ab le .  Although consideration of atmospheric environment e f f e c t s  i n  handling 
assessments i s  required,  t h e  method f o r  doing t h i s  is o f t en  i l l-defined. 
There appears t o  be common acceptance 
There i s  an  increasing need f o r  an orderly procedure f o r  combining t h e  
systems analyses ( r e l i a b i l i t y  and f a u l t  analyses) with t h e  f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  
eva lua t ion  process, taking t h e  l i k e l y  atmospheric states i n t o  account. Such 
a procedure can a i d  i n  t h e  achievement of design economies and a level of 
s a f e t y  equivalent t o  t h a t  of cu r ren t  t ranspor t s ;  t h i s  is a challenging t a s k  
s ince  t h e  cont r ibu t ion  of system f a i l u r e s  t o  ca t a s t roph ic  e f f e c t s  i s  a t  pres- 
e n t  a very s m a l l  proportion of t h e  t o t a l .  
procedures described i n  t h e  Anglo-French TSS 3 shows t h a t  add i t iona l  develop- 
ment e f f o r t  i s  needed t o  simplify implementation. Simplified procedures de- 
scribed i n  the  U.S. m i l i t a r y  spec i f i ca t ion  and lessons  learned from recent  
Autoland programs appear u se fu l  f o r  continuing s t u d i e s  devoted t o  t h i s  pur- 
pose. 
Review of t h e  probability-based 
I n  order t o  minimize f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  and t o  enable evaluation i n  spec i f ied  
atmospheric conditions and hazardous f a i l u r e  cases,  simulation techniques w i l l  
be used extensively i n  such procedures. Some recent  simulation experiences 
emphasize t h a t  turbulence e f f e c t s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  inf luence  t h e  p i l o t  evalua- 
t i o n s  of marginal configurations,  and t h a t  evaluation of such conditions some- 
t i m e s  r equ i r e s  more accura te  representa t ions  of t h e  p i l o t / a i r c r a f t  i n t e r f a c e  
( p i l o t  s t a t i o n  motions, e tc . )  than are provided i n  many cur ren t  engineering 
simulations e 
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Table 1. Def in i t ion  of p robab i l i t y  terms ( r e f .  8) 
Remote f a i l u r e s  
Fa i lu re s  I Type 
Major e f f e c t s  
Recurrent f a i l u r e s  
Extremely improbable 
f a i l u r e s  
Minor e f f e c t s  
Catastrophic  
e f f e c t s  
Extremely remote 
f a i l u r e s  
Hazardous 
e f f e c t s  
E f fec t s  
Def in i t ion  
Can r e a d i l y  be counteracted by crew and 
may involve: 
(a) small increase  i n  work load. 
(b) moderate degradat ion i n  perfor- 
manue o r  handling. 
(c)  s l i g h t  modif icat ions t o  t h e  per- 
miss ib le  f l i g h t  envelope. 
~ 
May produce: 
(a) s i g n i f i c a n t  increase  i n  crew work 
load. 
(b) s i g n i f i c a n t  degradation i n  perfor-  
mance o r  handling c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
( c )  s i g n i f i c a n t  modif icat ion of t h e  
permissible  f l i g h t  envelope. 
but w i l l  not  remove t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  
cont inue a s a f e  f l i g h t  and landing 
without demanding more than usua l  s k i l l  
on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  f l i g h t  crew. 
These e f f e c t s  may be more than major 
providing t h a t  t h e  o v e r a l l  r i s k  of 
ca tas t rophe  is extremely improbable, 
taking i n t o  account l i k e l y  c r e w  ac t ion .  
Resul t ing i n  f a t a l i t i e s .  
Recurrent. 
Remote. 
(Frequency of occurrence up t o  about 10-5 per hour of f l i g h t . )  
Expected t o  occur from time t o  t i m e  i n  t h e  l i f e  of an a i rp l ane .  
(Of t h e  order  of 10-5 t o  10-7 per  hour of f l i g h t . )  
t i m e s  dur ing t h e  t o t a l  opera t iona l  l i f e  of a type of a i r c r a f t .  
ample, a remote f a i l u r e  includes f a i l u r e  of two engines i n  one f l i g h t .  
f l i g h t . )  Unlikely t o  occur during t h e  t o t a l  opera t iona l  l i f e  of a l l  air- 
c r a f t  of a type, bu t  never the less  has t o  be considered as being poss ib le .  
So extremely remote t h a t  i t  can be s t a t e d  wi th  confi-  
dence t h a t  it should n o t  occur* 
May happen a few 
For ex- 
per  hour of ExtremeZy Remote. (Not expected t o  occur more o f t e n  than 
ExtremeZy ImprobabZe. 
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Table 2.- Flying q u a l i t i e s  l e v e l s  from MIL-F-8785B 
Description 
Flying q u a l i t i e s  c l e a r l y  adequate f o r  t h e  mission 
f l i g h t  phase 
Flying q u a l i t i e s  adequate t o  accomplish t h e  
mission f l i g h t  phase, but some increase  i n  p i l o t  
workload o r  degradation i n  mission e f fec t iveness ,  
o r  both, e x i s t s  
Flying q u a l i t i e s  such that t h e  a i rp l ane  can be con- 
t r o l l e d  sa fe ly ,  but p i l o t  workload is excessive o r  
mission e f fec t iveness  is  inadequate, o r  both. 
Category A f l i g h t  phases can be terminated sa fe ly ,  
and Category B and C f l i g h t  phases can be 
completed. - 
ATMOSPHERE 
FLE 
FAILURES 
PILOT SKILL 
Corresponding 
p i l o t  r a t i n g  
( in  general)  
1 - 3.5 
3.5 - 6.5 
6.5 - 9+ 
JS 
AIRFRAME 
STATE 
CONFIGURATION 
WEIGHT 
MASS DISTRIBUTION 
STABILITY AND CONTROL CHAR. 
Figure 1.- Factors influencing f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  
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FAR 25 AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES (ref. 2) 
SUBPARTS 
A. GENERAL 
6. FLIGHT 
GENERAL 
PERFORMANCE: RECIP. ENGINE POWERED AIRPLANES 
PERFORMANCE: TURBINE ENGINE POWERED AIRPLANES 
CONTROLLABILITY AND MANEUVERABILITY - 
TRIM & 
STAB1 LITY -(I 
STALLS & 
GROUND AND WATER HANDLING CHARACTERISTICS .(- 
MISCELLANEOUS FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS & 
C. STRUCTURE 
D. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION +... 
E. POWERPLANT 
F. EQUIPMENT I..* 
G. OPERATING LIMITATIONS AND INFORMATION 
- . -  
Figure 2.- FAR 25 o u t l i n e  ident i fy ing  sec t ions  of i n t e r e s t .  
SUBPART B FLIGHT 
25.181 DYNAMIC LONGITUDINAL, DIRECTIONAL, 
AND LATERAL STABILITY. 
BETWEEN STALLING SPEED AND MAXIMUM 
ALLOWABLE SPEED APPROPRIATE TO THE 
CONFIGURATION . . . MUST BE HEAVILY DAMPED 
WITH PRIMARY CONTROLS 11) FREE AND 
(2) IN A FIXED POSITION. 
ANY SHORT PERIOD OSCILLATION OCCURRING 
SUBPART B FLIGHT 
25.21M 
CHARACTERISTICS REQUIREMENTS IS 
DEPENDENT UPON A STABILITY 
AUGMENTATION SYSTEM OR UPON ANY 
OTHER AUTOMATIC OR POWER- 
OPERATED SYSTEM, COMPLIANCE MUST 
BE SHOWN WITH PARAGRAPHS 25.671 
AND 25.672. 
IF COMPLIANCE WITH THE FLIGHT 
Figure 3. -  Example of control 
SUBPART D DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 
25.671 CONTROL SYSTEMS - GENERAL 
IC) THE AIRPLANE MUST BE SHOWN BY ANALYSIS, TESTS, OR 
BOTH TO BE CAPABLE OF CONTINUED SAFE FLIGHT AND 
LANDING AFTER ANY OF THE FOLLOWING FAILURES OR 
JAMMING IN THE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM AND SURFACES 
. . . , WITHIN THE NORMAL FLIGHT ENVELOPE, WITHOUT 
REQUIRING EXCEPTIONAL PILOTING SKILL OR STRENGTH. 
PROBABLE MALFUNCTIONS MUST HAVE ONLY MINOR EFFECTS 
ON CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION AND MUST BE CAPABLE OF 
BEING READILY COUNTERACTED BY THE PILOT. 
11) ANY SINGLE FAILURE, EXCLUDING JAMMING. 
I21 ANY COMBINATION OF FAILURES NOT SHOWN TO BE 
(3) ANY JAM IN A CONTROL POSITION NORMALLY 
EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE, EXCLUDING JAMMING 
ENCOUNTERED . . . UNLESS THE JAM IS SHOWN TO 
BE EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE OR CAN BE ALLEVIATED . . 
25.672 STABILITY AUGMENTATION AND AUTOMATIC AND 
POWER-OPERATED SYSTEMS 
(bl THE DESIGN . . . MUST PERMIT INITIAL COUNTERACTION 
OF FAILURES OF THE TYPE SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 25.671(c) 
WITHOUT REQUIRING EXCEPTIONAL PILOT SKILL OR STRENGTH, 
BY EITHER DEACTIVATION OF THE SYSTEM, OR A FAILED 
PORTfON THEREOF, OR BY OVERRIDING THE FAILURE BY 
MOVEMENT OF THE FLIGHT CONTROLS IN THE NORMAL SENSE. 
(c )  IT  MUST BE SHOWN THAT AFTER ANY SINGLE FAILURE . . . 
(1) THE AIRPLANE IS SAFELY CONTROLLABLE WHEN THE 
FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION OCCURS AT ANY SPEED OR 
ALTITUDE WITHIN THE APPROVED OPERATING LIMITATIONS 
THAT ARE CRITICAL FOR THE TYPE OF FAILURE BEING 
CONSIDERED, 
12) THE CONTROLLABILITY AN0 MANEUVERABILITY REWIRE 
MENTS OF THIS PART ARE MET WITHIN A PRACTICAL 
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT ENVELOPE . . . DESCRIBED I N  THE 
AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL, AND 
13) THE TRIM, STABILITY, AND STALL CHARACTERISTICS ARE 
NOT IMPAIRED BELOW A LEVEL NEEDED TO PERMIT CONTINUED 
SAFE FLIGHT AND LANDING. 
system f a i l u r e  treatment i n  FAR 25. 
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1. FLIGHT SUBPHASE I 
PROB (INCIDENT/FLIGHT) = 1. : IP, x P"1 
SUBPHASES CLASSES OF 
DIFFICULTY 
, 1 
< SAFETY 
INDEX 
0 TEMPERATURE 
GRADIENT 
ON GROUND 
I I I 3.STATE OF THE I 
AIRCRAFT 
* MASS DISTRIBUTION 
0 SELECTED 
CONFIGURATION 
I I I FAILURES 
I l l  
TECHNIQUE 
CHOICES AVAILABLE 
TO PURSUE SUBPHPSE 
OBJECTIVE 
L--- 
> PLUS SECONDARY WORK 
(CHECKLIST, RADIO TRAFFIC, NAVIGATION) 
CONSTITUTE A TASK 
PROBABILITY ITASK) * 
PRDB (SUBPHASE PER FLIGHT) x 
PRO8 IATMOSPHERIC STATE DURING SUBPHASE] x 
PROB (AIRCRAFT STATE DURING SUBPHASE) x 
PRO8 IGIVEN CHOICE OF FLIGHT TECHNIQUE] 
_ -  
Figure 4 . -  Elements def in ing  the  "task" i n  TSS 3 ( r e f s .  1 & 1 6 ) .  
I SUBPC 
I SUSPHAS 
SUBPHASE ( 
PILOT EVALUATIONS 
P" 
I c3 10-1' .90 
3 c4 10-7 01 
4 C6 10-4 2 x 10-6 
- TASK C P, - -  - 
2 c4 .06 
Figure 5.- One poss ib l e  method described i n  TSS 3 ( r e f .  1 )  f o r  
showing compliance with handling requirement. 
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HANDLING QUALITIES RATING SCALE 
Figure 6.- Cooper-Harper p i l o t  r a t i n g  scale ( r e f .  10) .  
NORMAL STATES FAILURE STATES 
PROB (LEVEL 2) 
< PER FLIGHT 
PROB (LEVEL 3) OPERATIONAL 
< 10-4 PER FLIGHT 
PROB (LEVEL 3) 
ENVELOPE < PER FLIGHT 
Figure 7.- MIL-F-8785B minimum f l y i n g  q u a l i t i e s  requirements. 
DURATION OF LONGEST FLIGHT 
DURING OPERATIONAL MISSIONS 
ITY OF ENCOUNTERING 
FAILURE STATE PER FLIGHT 
COMPLIES 
DOES NOT 
COMPLY 
COMPLIES 
PROBABI LlTY 
DOES NOT 
COMPLY 
COMPLl ES 
PROBABILITY 
DOES NOT 
COMPLY 
Figure 8.- MLL-F-8785B procedure for determining theoretical compliance 
with airplane failure state requirements. 
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h 
A 5. CERTIFICATION 
(- 100 LANDINGS) 
2. HARDWARE SIMULATION 
(SEVERAL THOUSAND LANDINGS) 
1. ANALYSIS AN0 DIGITALIANALOG SIMULATION 
(- 3,000,000 LANDINGS) 
Figure 9.- Progressive simulation and t e s t i n g  i n  Autoland 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n  ( re f .  13). 
/' 
ALL SAS FAILED 
TOOL - NASAIAMES 
FLIGHT SIMULATOR FOR 
ADVANCED AIRCRAFT 
TOOL - USAFICALSPAN 
TOTAL IN FLIGHT 
SIMULATOR 
Figure 10,- Simulation study of minimum long i tud ina l  s t a b i l i t y  
f o r  SAS-failed landing. 
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8 
6 
PILOT 
RATING 
4 
10 r FSAA PILOT RATING SAND 
o,, = 0.91 m/sec (ref. 18) 
UNACCEPTABLE 
REGION 
TIFS MEAN COMPENSATED 
PILOT RATINGS (ref. 19) 
0 2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2  
Tzu, S ~ C  
Figure 11.- Pilot rating vs time to double amplitude Tza, showing effect of 
turbulence intensity (Og is rms value). Landing task, unaugmented 
delta-wing transport. 
CORRESPONDING TOTAL 
VERTICAL TRAVEL, meters 
24 18 11 6.7 4.0 2.4 0 
I )  I l l 1  T 
0 
a a -2 
t -1 a 
-1 
.2 .3 .5 .7 1.0 1.4 NO 
WASHOUT FILTER FREQUENCY MOTION 
w,, rad/sec 
Figure 12.- Vertical motion effects on landing performance (ref. 20). 
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